Abstract. Spanish officials in eastern Panamá believed that Christianized Indians would serve as surrogates for Spanish settlers or troops, and their attempts to administer the region were grounded upon establishing alliances with selected Indian leaders. At the same time, pirates and other intruders also saw the need for alliances with Indian men in order for their endeavors to succeed. Through a process in which Europeans and Indians played an equal part, the early modern period saw the creation of several new indigenous leaders. The chieftains who interacted with outsiders were forced to create new ways of ruling on the ground as they navigated through an evolving colonial world in the Darién. This world was clearly built upon indigenous models, though it was not exactly indigenous. And though it drew upon European administrative forms and symbols for a good portion of its legitimacy, it was not recognizably European either.
the missionizing activities of a band of Dominican friars, and at the end of the century Julián's son Luis provided the local Spanish defense against the incursions of the buccaneers and the short-lived colony of the Scots. 2 Following Luis Carrisoli's death in  the Spanish position in the Darién eroded, and the rebellion of  exposed the grave problem the region posed to the Spanish imperial system. This article analyzes the activities of a new generation of officials, men such as Dionisio Martínez de la Vega and Dionisio de Alsedo, as they struggled to ''reconquer'' the eastern portion of the isthmus after .
The Panamanian isthmus, a place so vital to Spanish endeavors at the start of the conquest of the Americas, had become a troubled frontier zone by the close of the sixteenth century. The Spanish conquistadors, having arrived in the Darién at the end of , quickly established the isthmus as a strategic springboard for their various expeditions of conquest and exploration. In  Vasco Núñez de Balboa, with the assistance of indigenous allies, discovered the transisthmian route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Balboa derived fame but little profit from his discovery, and in  he fell victim to a judicial murder at the hands of his rival, Pedrarias Davila, governor of Castilla de Oro. 3 Pedrarias presided over the plundering of the isthmus, during which the indigenous population of central Panamá declined precipitously. 4 After the conquest of the Inka state in Peru in  the Spanish population of Panamá diminished, as that richer realm siphoned off unattached adventurers. Furthermore, economic and social development in New Spain to the north and Peru to the south relegated early Panamá to the position of a tertiary economy reliant upon shipping and the transportation of goods from other realms across the isthmus. 5 By the latter part of the sixteenth century English and French pirates, recognizing the value of attacking the Spanish empire at its vulnerable isthmian choke point, stepped up their disruptive attacks, establishing a durable model for future intruders by coordinating their activities with the region's indigenous people and African rebels. 6 Creating a ''Darién Tribe'' from the Tule People By the start of the seventeenth century, Spanish officials had established colonial rule over the central isthmus; decimated, converted, and subdued that region's Indians; and secured a negotiated peace with the rebel African communities. While the isthmus was more or less secure at its center, its eastern border proved impossible to seal off from foreign attack and intrusion. Spanish efforts were directed at controlling and converting the region's indigenous population, and throughout the seventeenth cen-actions with Spanish officials. 10 In addition, these and other indigenous leaders made diplomatic overtures to the non-Spanish intruders to the Darién. The French and English buccaneers who operated in the region between  and  and the Scottish intruders who arrived between  and  all found willing Tule allies. In the s, the period under scrutiny in this essay, it was the Spanish who attempted to exert a modicum of colonial control over a region that they had recently ignored. Spanish officials from Panamá City worked to construct a rejuvenated colonial system by negotiating a devolution of power upon a generation of Tule leaders, men who had acquired considerable skills through their adept management of diplomatic relationships with the various competing outsiders.
This article examines the manner in which the Spanish attempt to reconquer the Darién through a policy of peace encouraged the emergence of several new tribal Tule leaders. These men judiciously utilized the strategic reality presented to them by the Spanish maneuvers to reestablish an imperial administration in the region. Through the manipulation of rhetoric and colonial politics, they strove to consolidate some Tule villagers into what the Spanish would recognize as an Indian tribe. Their actions were met with compliance, resistance, and, at times, indifference by the inhabitants of the communities of the Darién. Together, however, the emerging chiefs, the Tule villagers, and the European intruders took part in a recoverable historical process that has not yet been described accurately or in detail.
The Structure of Peace in the Darién
A royal order of  February  called for officials in the Americas to oversee the conquest of the Darién. It prompted the viceroy to confer with the new presidente of the audiencia of Panamá, Dionisio Martínez de la Vega, on  June . Martínez informed his superior that he would need five hundred trained Spanish soldiers to put an end to warfare in the Darién. 11 Such an extravagant complement of men, arms, and matériel was not forthcoming from the viceroy, however, and the situation festered until April , when Martínez offered the hostile Indians a general pardon in return for the cessation of the attacks against the Spanish. 12 A group of Tule caciques responded favorably to Martínez's offer of amnesty in the fall of , the result, the presidente triumphantly opined, of two years of constant pressure, which included the destruction of the rebels' means of subsistence and retributive attacks by tribal Chocó warriors allied to Spain. 13 On the other hand, the spokesmen for the caciques themselves later reported that they had chosen peace over continued hos-tilities because several epidemics and natural disasters had decimated their people, making further resistance difficult, if not impossible. 14 Individual Tule leaders made positive initial responses to the amnesty, but Martínez informed them that he sought a grander settlement, one that would encompass all of the ''Darién Indians.'' A cacique named Felipe Merina informed Martínez that this goal, however worthy, would not be easily achieved. The Indian stated that as far as he was concerned, ''the peace could only be for the Río Chucunaque, of which he was head. He simply did not possess the power to make peace for the entire province. '' 15 Martínez responded by giving the caciques with whom he had had contact an ultimatum: they had six weeks to decide whether to be represented by a single cacique, who would come forward and sign a comprehensive peace treaty with him, or else Martínez would recommence hostilities against them. 16 The six-week interval would be ample, he assumed, to allow the leaders to order their affairs and agree to the peace.
The presidente's desire to deal with a single, powerful cacique no doubt led to competition among autonomous Tule leaders to stand as the single man who would be recognized by Martínez as the paramount leader of a substantial portion of the Darién's Indians. 17 Throughout the seventeenth century, long-term Spanish-Tule contact had resulted in the opening up of leadership opportunities for Tule men who wished to put themselves forward as self-styled chieftains, and Spanish strategic needs had now forced upon the polity the selection of a paramount chief to act as spokesman and guarantor of a comprehensive peace treaty. 18 The Tule man who emerged as the supreme tribal cacique was a chieftain named Juan Chani or Sanni. This man, also known as Tunchile, had played a central, destructive role in the Indian uprising of -. However, it now appeared that he had decided to take a part on the new tribal stage that Spanish colonialism offered him. 19 On  October  Sanni journeyed to Panamá City to iron out the peace with the presidente, and he made it clear that although he was escorted solely by Marzelo del Castillo of Molineca and his interpreter, Pedro Santiago Cabrejo, he was, in fact, the ruler of an Indian nation numbering some five hundred men, women, and children. 20 The cacique made an important point immediately, stating that the term rebel was not the proper one to be used in relation to his people, since they had merely provided assistance to certain individuals in distress. Adopting a more conciliatory note, Sanni then conveyed to the presidente his desire for peace, which he promised was the general wish of his people. 21 The treaty that Sanni negotiated aimed to do nothing less than effect a total reorganization of Tule administrative life under a rejuvenated SpanThe Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, -  ish administration. The provisions of the treaty revealed that Juan Sanni and other, now-lesser Tule leaders had wielded considerable power during its negotiation. The first protocol of the pact, for example, included one of many Spanish concessions to the Tule, granting that ''the people of the northern band, who have always lived dispersed, are granted the liberty to remain that way for the next ten years.'' 22 Therefore, while on one level it represented a Spanish attempt to impose a form of colonial dominion over a newly tribalized Tule people, in reality the pact signaled an acceptance by the Spanish of messy current realities, something especially evident in Martínez's dispensing with the consistently failed policy of expanding the reducciones.
The third protocol was even more remarkable. It stated that no Indian would be ''pressured or forced by violence to accept the Christian faith. '' 23 The Spanish here accepted a weakened policy of voluntary missionization in which Indians who had already been converted would continue to live under religious discipline at the existing reducciones, while those who chose not to reduce themselves would be left in peace, so long as they did not commit acts of violence or rebellion against the Spanish administration. 24 In addition, the treaty formalized the gift exchange, which the Tule leaders called the paniquiris and moras, which, the text stated, ''had been given to the Indians for the longest time.'' 25 Although a high-level investigation of the Crown's ledgers had failed to find the official accounts for the previous presents, 26 the gifts were proclaimed to be valid, extrajudicial grants. 27 In an act that displayed a deft rhetorical sleight of hand, the paniquiris and moras were redefined as a type of clothing, and the pact ordered the presidentes to continue providing these traditional items of exchange, since the king and consejo both greatly approved of clothes being given to the Indians ''to enhance their decency. '' 28 The treaty-making Tule leaders clearly extracted every concession they could, even dictating that only Jesuit priests would be allowed to enter the Darién and tend to the reducciones. 29 In addition, the pact stipulated that no persons of African descent would be allowed to enter the Darién without the expressed permission of the principal cacique. 30 The fifth protocol dealt with the province's leadership structure, and as such was perhaps the treaty's most vital provision. It stated in simple language that ''due to problems with the teniente generales in the past, the Indians will be ruled only by their own caciques, and all caciques are subordinate to Juan Sanni. All of these native leaders, including Sanni, are, in turn, subordinate to the governor of the province.'' 31 Martínez's treaty, therefore, legalized a new tribal structure of rulership for the province, covering leaders from the highest cacique to the smallest riverine chief. The provisions covering the tribe's system of overlordship were detailed and supplemented by the remarkable statement that ''every river shall have a captain, whom the governor must approve in order for him to hold that office. '' 32 Strategic constraints during a time of heightened British-Spanish pressures had forced officials to negotiate the tribalization of the Tule, a process that they had previously assumed would occur as the result of long-term interactions and confrontations that would comprise a sequence of contact, conquest, and missionization. The treaty of  changed the pace of this development, and it was negotiated and signed principally because all of the players needed the peace that it promised. Martínez got peace from the pact; Sanni got the leadership of a tribe; and the royal consejo de Indias believed that the treaty would provide regional security as the Crown prepared for a war in the Caribbean. With so many factors acting in its favor, the pact received royal approval on  October . 33 Once the tribalization process in the Darién had gathered some momentum, it took on a contagious quality. When Felipe Uriñaquichu, the leader of the Tule living at the Gulf of Urabá, learned in late  of the presidente's audacious pact, he approached Martínez and signed an almost identical agreement. 34 The tribalization fever had yet to fully run its course, for a party of Frenchmen, former buccaneers who also lived at the Gulf of Urabá, chose this opportunity to seek the Crown's pardon and themselves become signatories to the comprehensive treaty. These long-outlawed men, ruled by a European cacique of their own choosing named Santos Bullico, became vassals of the Spanish Crown and acquired legal standing as a chartered buffer community within a tribal Darién. 35 With the taming of the French levantados, Dionisio Martínez de la Vega's attempt to bring order to the chaotic Indian country appeared to have achieved tangible results. As Spain prepared for a possible war against Britain, the Darién could be removed from the Crown's list of the most problematic trouble spots. The presidente clearly had engineered an acceptable short-term solution, but only time would tell whether Martínez's attempt to tribalize the Darién by treaty would prove a long-term success. Although Martínez brimmed with optimism, the future would almost certainly be fraught with perils for him. For Juan Sanni and, to a lesser extent, Felipe Uriñaquichu had been granted remarkable administrative powers within the suddenly colonial Darién.
The novelty of this arrangement in the Darién upset the fragile political equilibrium that Spanish officials had established at other isthmian frontier zones. The Spanish effort to extend the frontier eastward to the Darién was not welcomed by those indigenous leaders who had made their careers as representatives of colonial authority on the Chepo frontier. In April , soon after the treaty had been negotiated with Juan Sanni, the cacique of the Indians of Chepo paid Martínez a visit, and the presidente reported to the Crown in a letter of  May , ''The cacique Don Ventura showed himself on this occasion to be most displeased. Having stayed with me here for several days he was treated with the greatest respect as he is one of the chieftains who controls a major force of the Indians. At the frontier, by the fort of Chepo, he took his leave of me understanding that he had been very well treated by me. '' 36 Tribal leaders from what previously had been the sole frontier region near Chepo clearly preferred that the Darién remain a marginalized Indian country. Since any changes in its situation and, most important, in the standing of its leaders, could have a direct effect on their lives and livelihoods, these men preferred the status quo.
The Jesuit Entrada, October -February  The Spanish-Tule peace treaty of  had stipulated, in accordance with Indian wishes, that only Jesuit missionaries would be given leave to enter the Darién. Since the eastern Panamá frontier straddled separate imperial jurisdictions, the royal cédula that placed the king's imprimatur on the treaty ordered that the provinces of Quito and Santa Fe were each to contribute men to the effort. Jesuits from Quito would missionize the northern tribe of the Tule people, whose territory stretched from the central mountains to the South Sea, while the missionaries from Santa Fe would minister to the Indians of the southern tribe, who lived on either side of the Gulf of Urabá.
In March  the father general of the Jesuit order, Father Francisco Retz, wrote a letter to the provincial of Quito, Baltazar de Moncada. The royal cédula of  March , he insisted, required Moncada to dispatch missionaries from his province into the Darién. 37 However, Moncada had a full plate of issues before him at the time he received Retz's letter, the most important being the stabilization of Quito's Jesuit establishment after the recent turmoil it had suffered during the visitation of Padre Andrés de Zárate. 38 Moncada was unable to act on the urgings of his superior, and the matter fell to his successor, Carlos Brentan. 39 Brentan, having served in the missions along the Amazon River for more than fourteen years, placed a high premium on Jesuit missionary activity in the province. Upon assuming the office, he made a personal visita of the province, traveling the length and breadth of the enormous region in . 40 After this undertaking the new provincial selected two men to missionize the Darién and escorted them northward to the isthmus. His coffers in Quito being empty, Brentan knew that he would have to ask the audiencia of Panamá to allocate the funds necessary to support the missionaries. Accompanied by Fathers Joaquín Álvarez and Claudio Escobar, 41 Brentan made the difficult trip though the forests of Barbacoas, the Chocó, and the Darién. The Jesuits completed their journey to Panamá City on  February . 42 Less than a week after their arrival, Brentan presented himself before the audiencia and the new presidente, Dionisio de Alsedo. 43 Brentan made an earnest plea for the support of his companions who were to labor in the Darién, arguing that the two men would each require  pesos per annum, sums the Jesuit colegios of Quito and Panamá could not provide. On  March  presidente Alsedo convened the junta de hacienda, at which expenditures would be discussed. The presidente summarized Brentan's earlier petition and underscored the vital necessity of missionary activity in ensuring the security of the isthmus. To clinch his argument Alsedo provided informes written by Captains Félix Muñoz de Guzmán and Manuel de Arago, governors of the Darién, and by the protector of the Indians, Joaquín Balcárcel de Miranda, which described the tenuous Spanish position in the Darién. 44 Under the weight of all the detailed testimony, the audiencia shouldered the burden of financially supporting the two Jesuit missionaries. The junta unanimously voted to provide the priests with their salaries and enjoined them ''to teach the evangelical law to the inhabitants of that province and marchland, reducing them through the sweetness of those doctrines to the knowledge of the one true God and the mysteries of our holy, apostolic, and Roman Catholic faith, and awakening them from the blindness of their idolatry and giving them the clear light of the perfect religion. '' 45 The few Spaniards serving in government or military positions in eastern Panamá, however, were gripped by doubt and confusion in October . 46 At the time the pair of Jesuits entered the region, the principal settlement in the Darién was a small military fort at El Real de Santa María, located at the junction of the Tuíra and Chucunaque rivers. 47 Upon reaching El Real padres Joaquín Álvarez and Claudio Escobar found themselves drawn into a petty struggle that threatened to doom their endeavor before they had actually begun the task. The cause of the trouble was a secular priest named Juan de Pomar y Burgos, who was being held against his will at the fort when the Jesuits got there. 48 Joaquín Álvarez immediately went to work to set the situation to rights. He calmed frayed Spanish tempers by proposing that the jailed priest, and the troublesome comisionario who had been dispatched high-handedly to retrieve and punish him, leave the fort of El Real in his custody and that they make their way together back to Panamá City. The priest assured the men that he would convince Alsedo
The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, -  not to delve any further into the matter and that any questionable activities that the comisionario had carried out in the Darién would be ignored.
Having calmed the Spaniards, Álvarez then worked to alleviate Indian fears. He traveled to Yavisa and preached the gospel to the Indians he found there, bringing the son of the most important man of that small settlement to El Real for baptism. Having established this small, yet hopeful, foundation, Álvarez journeyed to Panamá City on his mediatory errand. 49 When he returned to the Darién, Álvarez became convinced that the two Jesuits who were slated to work near the Gulf of Urabá could expect trouble. He learned that the Frenchmen living there had informed the Indians that the Spanish priests had come to the region to despoil the earth so that the Indians would be deprived of food, the better to enslave them and subject them to tyranny. The Frenchmen were said to have warned the Darién Indians that ''if they admit [ted] the Jesuits they will do in the Darién what they had done in . . . Paraguay which was to make themselves the despotic masters of the entire province, holding the Indians as vassals.'' 50 These comments illustrate that the different inhabitants of the Darién were evaluating the meaning of the Jesuit entrada into their lands, a process that had begun prior to the actual arrival of the missionaries. 51 The Jesuits made strategically located Yavisa their base of operations among the Tule, and Álvarez reported that upon his return there the young man whom he had baptized two months earlier welcomed him to the town by kneeling, praising the Lord, ''and acting as if he were the most ancient of Christians.'' 52 The convert assisted in the indoctrination of the ten armed men and their women and children who resided at the river, and none of the villagers showed the slightest hostility, allowing him to preach, offer gifts, and say the mass. The Jesuit, after baptizing nine young boys, reported that their families repaid him with hospitality and kindness, and ''the Indians offered [him] things, of the kind that they partook of in their own houses, which, although they were of the most rustic sort, such as bananas and monkey, [he] accepted with the highest appreciation. '' 53 After this success, Álvarez sent various kindly worded messages to Juan Sanni in the hope of gaining entry into the cacique's lands in the remote upper Chucunaque region. Sanni rebuffed all of these overtures, leading Álvarez to conclude that Sanni, ''though a friend in name, had been painted an enemy by his actions.'' 54 Although the direct route to the man named in the treaty as the supreme Tule leader had been obstructed by that Indian's stubborn rejection of the faith, Álvarez set off on a second path, opening friendly relations with the man known as Sanni's brother, capitán Juan de Dios. It is unclear whether Juan de Dios and Juan Sanni were actually biological brothers or whether their relationship was a political or an adoptive one. To Álvarez, however, they clearly seemed to be the sons of the same mother.
The Jesuit claimed that several meetings were all that were required for him to teach capitán Juan de Dios the benefits of the Catholic faith and a Christian life. Following these encounters, Álvarez convinced the Indian leader to leave behind his pagan ways. 55 By forging such a close relationship with Álvarez, Juan de Dios had stepped out of the shadows and from now forward would become a major force in the new, colonial politics of the Darién province. Though he had been present at most of the meetings that formalized the Hispano-Tule peace, Juan de Dios was not recorded as having said anything at those momentous occasions. He was recognized as one among the many lieutenants of Juan Sanni and was duly rewarded with the honorific capitán after the signing of the treaty, but during protector Balcárcel's travels to the upper Chucunaque in  Juan de Dios had served solely as his guide. Again, he stood as a silent partner to those proceedings, appearing to all observers to be of far less importance than the paramount leader of the Tule, Juan Sanni. 56 The treaties gave the Jesuit missionaries the power to create new reducciones, settlements whose leaders would be tethered to Spanish lines of patronage, funding, taxation, and defense. The novel municipal and provincial power structure provided opportunities for self-styled village leaders like Juan de Dios to enhance their power. The potential for instability was increased by the fact that Spanish officials such as Alsedo were not particularly concerned that the benefits of office flow directly to those men who had led Tule villages in the past. Not surprisingly, the Tule men to whom they would hand provincial power needed to be, most especially, Christians willing to further Spanish aims. If Sanni were willing to serve in this position, the honors of a Spanish-American provincial cacique would be bestowed upon him. If he hesitated or, in the worst case, followed a path of resistance, the mantle of Tule leadership would be stripped from him and placed on the shoulders of another man. Juan de Dios was positioning himself to be that man and was hoping to amass a large measure of the colonial spoils the Spanish were offering to the Indian leaders of the Darién. Just how high he had set his sights would not become clear, however, until the Jesuits set out to convert the man the Spanish had named as the first Tule cacique, his ''brother'' Juan Sanni.
Prior to hearing from Sanni, and possibly to force his compliance, Álvarez had begun to groom Juan de Dios to occupy a central position in a newly Christian hispanic Darién. Exactly what that position would be depended entirely on the actions of Juan Sanni. In his letters to Alsedo, the Jesuit upgraded capitán de Dios's status and began to name him as Sanni's
The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, -  primary lieutenant. Álvarez also commented glowingly upon the many sacrifices that Juan de Dios had already made for the faith. For example, the Indian had expressed the wish to marry within the church and turn his back upon his other wives, an act that Álvarez described as heroic. In addition, the capitán promised to provide the materials and labor necessary for the building of the church at Yavisa. In stark contrast to his dealings with Juan de Dios, Álvarez associated Juan Sanni with stubborn opposition to his aims and resistance to the Catholic faith. Though he had been a prominent leader of the region's Indians and had been dealing with outsiders for nearly twenty years when the Jesuit missionaries arrived, Juan Sanni's place at the center of the Darién's affairs was in peril. 57 In late January protector Balcárcel called for the major Indian leaders to meet with him at El Real. He had sent invitations to Felipe Uriñaquichu, the leader of the Tule of the northern tribe; the cacique Juan Sanni; and the capitán of the recently pardoned Frenchmen, Santos Bullico. Balcárcel reported to Alsedo that on  January  Santos Bullico and Francisco Fotoqua arrived at El Real ''with various Indians . . . except for the cacique [Juan Sanni], who is gravely ill.'' 58 The men who arrived to take counsel with Balcárcel at El Real were from the Urabá region, and while they told him what he wanted to hear, they also sounded a note of caution. Although they were in accord with the provisions of the treaties and most willing and eager to accept the entry of the Jesuits, their people, however, might need a little more time to get used to the new situation. The Frenchmen were the most blunt in the group, stating that missionization of the Darién would not be easy going. 59 At the close of their interview, the men conveyed a message from Juan Sanni to the protector in which the cacique minimized his ailment, stating simply that he had been felled by a temporary, though bothersome, illness. 60 Sanni promised to relocate to the village of Tiligantí and bring enough of his people there to form a town that could serve as a nucleus for the missionary operations of the Jesuit priests. He ended his message by apologizing for having previously destroyed the village that had formerly stood at the site, and he offered to provide the Indians to be missionized by the Jesuits, as well as the African labor necessary to build the places in which the priests would live and worship. In short, Sanni was informing the Spanish secular authorities that he had changed face, and, in doing so, he outmaneuvered Juan de Dios. That Indian leader had conveyed the news of the benefits of a Christian life to his presumed brother Juan Sanni, and the cacique, perhaps pressured by the actions of the convert, relented, finally issuing an invitation to the Jesuits to come and teach him about the faith. 61 After receiving Sanni's message, the two Jesuits decided that Álvarez All of the observers who reported on Sanni's deathbed conversion depicted it as one of the transcendent moments in the history of the SpanishAmerican empire. The baptism was a confirmation of the Christian faith, a vindication of Spanish aims and ideals, a feather in the cap for the Jesuit missionary, and a strategic victory for the presidente in Panamá City. Previously regarded by the Spanish as a rebellious pagan chieftain with a penchant for trafficking with the enemy, Sanni was immediately accorded a new status, akin to that bestowed upon the converted lords who ruled the European states that had succeeded the Roman Empire. The Spanish in Panamá believed that the sacrament had set in motion a series of irresistible processes, all of which would benefit the Spanish Crown. The Tule of the southern tribe would follow Sanni into the Christian faith; the men would repudiate all but one of their multiple wives; and the population would settle down in reduced towns as the priests desired. Álvarez's labors had brought to the faith a recalcitrant pagan whose dramatic conversion would usher in the pacification of this troublesome region.
Sanni, of course, appeared in Álvarez's and Alsedo's accounts by means of messages that he supposedly conveyed to Álvarez and the protector of Indians and interim governor of the province, Joaquín Balcárcel de Miranda. By the time Álvarez traveled from Yavisa to Arquiati to meet Sanni, the cacique had become a powerless, prostrate figure on a cot, near death. According to Álvarez's account, Sanni even bestowed a blessing in his final wish, informing Álvarez that it was his desire that all of his offices and titles should devolve upon his brother, Juan de Dios.
The cacique Juan Sanni then gave up the ghost, a mere six or seven minutes after having been offered the sacrament of baptism. He was a Christian in the end. 66 Because Sanni had died in the faith, his named, Christian successor would be the man to provide the Spanish civil and ecclesiastical officials with tangible proof that the Darién Indians had submitted to both the Christian faith and Spanish laws. Sanni's successor was,
The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, -  of course, none other than Juan de Dios. The secondary figure, who had stood in the shadows during the negotiation of the peace in , was now King Philip V's highest-ranking Indian vassal in the province of the Darién.
Juan de Dios took advantage of the presence of the missionaries in order to enhance his own position at Juan Sanni's expense. Although Juan de Dios's play for power was a risky one, in the end he was perhaps most aided in his quest by epidemic disease, the result of the increased Spanish activity in the Darién. At the time of the Jesuit's entrada the Darién was in the punishing grip of viruelas, or smallpox, and when Juan Sanni became one of the epidemic's victims, his illness left a vacuum in the Tule political structure. This vacuum occurred just at the time when relationships between Spanish officials and Indian leaders were being increasingly formalized. The Christian Juan de Dios, already consolidating a position with the new Jesuit power in the region, took full advantage of his brother's illness to monopolize the power the Spanish would confer on the indigenous leaders of a hispanicized Darién. 67
Celebrating the Fruits of Success
Presidente Alsedo soon celebrated the proof that the religious conquest was proceeding favorably, announcing in a decree of  February  that just recently there has appeared at the dock here, in the royal piragua which serves to transport food and supplies to the men quartered at the forts in the Darién, the very Reverend Father Joaquín Álvarez, the interpreter Juan de Urive, with Juan de Dios, brother of the cacique, his woman Doña Thomasa, a son of the Captain named Juan Joseph, Don Andrés Moreti, Lere and chief of the river of his name, and eight other Indians of the said cacique's jurisdiction, all baptized as Christians by Father Álvarez. 68
Juan de Dios came to Panamá City with several objectives in mind, and he voiced them to Alsedo as soon as the two met: he wished to present himself to the governor as a Christian; to have the succession of his brother's cacigazgo conferred upon him; to be named coronel of the militia troop of the Darién; and to have the lere of Moreti named as capitán, in the position he himself would vacate upon being named the cacique. Alsedo graciously received the Indian leaders who had come to Panamá City, made them aware that he considered them to be Christian vassals of the king of Spain, and announced publicly that he deemed them all ''worthy of distinction and respect.'' 69 The governor welcomed Father Álvarez, Juan de Dios, and the cacique's wife to eat at his table and extended the invitation to any others whom the Amerindians saw fit to join them. 70 In addition, Alsedo covered the expenses the visitors might incur in the city, granting each of the Indians two reales for each day that they were to be his guests. The cacique and his wife were each granted an additional peso per day ''and the corresponding paniquiris and moras.'' 71 The codification of the exchange of the paniquiris and moras signaled the development of a more complex relationship between the Spanish administration and the tribal Indian leaders of the Darién. Following the peace process of , the paniquiris and moras evolved into a method through which the Indians hispanicized the kind of gift exchange that would originally have resolved a dispute between indigenous leaders. Although Alsedo may have been ignorant of the fact, his predecessors had countenanced a cycle of exchange that had created certain expectations on the part of the Indian leaders. If the Tule-Spanish relationship were to exist on a firm footing, the process would need to be extended, and Alsedo's unblinking order that the payments be continued is evidence that he felt that Indian-Spanish relationships had achieved a new level of stability and integration.
Juan de Dios showed himself to be extremely flexible in this new situation, accepting the cash that the governor offered him as the payment of the paniquiris and moras, while he surely knew that in the past these exchange items had always taken the form of linen goods. Though the original meaning of the exchange of the paniquiris and moras was far removed from the simple use of cash to discharge a debt in the manner in which Alsedo described, the cacique accepted the money graciously and without demur.
In a decree of the next day Alsedo named Juan de Dios coronel of the militia of the southern part of the Darién and head of the cacigazgo covering the same territory with the same salary in that office as had been granted to his recently dead brother. Juan de Dios followed this by ratifying the peace with the Spanish. Then the Indian leader respectfully made four requests. After first thanking Father Álvarez for bringing the Christian faith to him, Juan de Dios asked that only Jesuits be allowed to enter his lands, since the Indians had grown accustomed to their care and would be mistrustful of members of another religious order. His second request was that Don Félix Muñoz, who had been involved in the negotiations with Sanni, be named commander general of the Darién, which was Sanni's dying wish. Third, Juan de Dios asked that the protector of the Indians keep a ledger, which the capitanes could inspect at their request, in which the Indians would sign and date the receipt of their respective salaries. This would prevent the awkward situations that had arisen in the past in which capitanes had accepted what they thought to have been gifts only to be rudely inThe Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, -  formed, when they had appeared to collect their salaries later on, that such payment had already been disbursed. Finally, Juan de Dios requested that he be allowed to receive his salary of thirty pesos for the month of February immediately, so that he could buy stores and supplies while he was in Panamá City. 72 These requests were relatively simple for Alsedo to handle; he demurred only on the second point, which was a matter entirely in the hands of the viceroy. The first request had already been agreed to by the Crown in the royal cédula of March , and the third was an arrangement of administrative efficiency whose value was evident to all. Regarding the final request, Alsedo not only disbursed Juan de Dios's salary, he also ordered that the other capitanes in his company be given a month's salary while they were in Panamá City. 73 On  February the bishop of the city, Don Juan de Casañada Velás-quez y Salazar, confirmed the Indians who had come in the company of Father Álvarez. 74 After the bishop gave public certification to the religious conversions of the leaders of Darién's Indians, Panamá's military establishment proceeded to pay public homage to the new military officers of the Darién. The next day the capitán of the second battalion of grenadiers of the city of Panamá formed the battalion at the city's plaza, and the coronel of the Darién's militia was presented to the troops. The capitán read the cacique's commission before the assembled troops and dignitaries, and at the close of the ceremony Juan de Dios was received by the grenadiers with great acclaim. 75 Alsedo assented to Juan de Dios's wishes regarding Andrés, the lere of Moreti, who was duly named to the position of capitán that Juan himself had vacated to become the region's cacique and coronel. The copy of the decreto that named Andrés Ruiz a capitán of the militia provided graphic evidence of the transitional nature of the arrangements being worked out for the Darién. The text stated that Alsedo did ''approve of the election and proposition made by the supplicant of the Lere de Moreti.'' 76 A line has scored through the words ''Lere de Moreti'' in the document, apparently because the writer or reciter realized that the Tule lere was the word for the ritual specialist of the pagan religion. Immediately following the scored passage, the lere is renamed Andrés Ruiz, which may illustrate Alsedo's prevention of the scribe from utilizing the honorific by which the applicant had previously been known.
On  February the secretary of the audiencia recorded several oaths administered by Governor Alsedo and sworn to by Juan de Dios. 77 Alsedo began by asking if Juan de Dios were a Christian and faithful vassal of King Philip V, to which Juan de Dios replied, ''Yes.'' Following this ad-mission, Juan de Dios was brought to the governor's private chapel, where a light was directed upon the crucifix at the center of the room. The cacique was asked to swear to uphold the peace treaty that had been signed by his brother, to affirm that the Indians within his cacigazgo would reduce themselves to live in Christian towns, to swear that he would obey all of the king's commands, to defend the jurisdiction he was being given, and, finally, to prevent the entry of foreign enemies into the region under his command. To all of these requests he answered solemnly, ''Yes,'' and swore the oath three times, in the end offering to comply with its provisions to the very loss of his life.
In his trek to Panamá City with the Indian leaders, Father Álvarez provided the kind of pageant that Dionisio de Alsedo y Herrera had expected. In less than one year the Jesuit could claim to have single-handedly brought the greater part of the Indian population of eastern Panamá under Spanish Christian administration. The new cacique of the Darién had been a guest at his table and had, in Alsedo's private prayer room, sworn to defend the Christian faith, the Spanish Crown, and the lands that had been entrusted to him. Álvarez could convince himself that he had set in motion a drama akin to the great conversions of the early church, in which pagan kings declared themselves and their people followers and defenders of the church. For the time being, Alsedo could bask in the glory of believing that he had converted the Darién, one of the empire's most notorious costas bravas, into a pacified region of the Spanish empire. It was a belief that would not be savored for long.
A Stark Change of Fortune
In June  the viceroy of the new kingdom of Granada, Sebastián Eslava, requested from Alsedo an account of the missionary activity that had taken place to date before he disbursed the considerable sum of  pesos to the Jesuits working in the Darién. Governor Alsedo asked Pablo Maroni, the rector of the Jesuit colegio of Panamá, to prepare an informe to send to the viceroy. Maroni had been a companion of Brentan's, serving with him in the missions along the Amazon in the kingdom of Quito, and Alsedo relied upon him as a knowledgeable and experienced source regarding missionary affairs in his jurisdiction. Maroni's report, dated  July , was a frank and reasoned assessment of missionary activity in the Darién. 78 Maroni reported that rather than confine himself to the region of the Chucunaque, Claudio Escobar had been assigned to work with the Indians of the Gulf of Urabá, where he attempted to persuade the Tule leader, Felipe Uriñaquichu, to allow missionaries to enter the territory. There were The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, -  immediate problems. The Frenchmen residing in the area were furious with the chief for having admitted the Jesuits in the first place and soon put both the chief and the missionary to flight. The two eventually settled in the town of Paya, where Escobar attempted to form a reducción with little success. 79 Maroni reported that large populations of Indians could not be concentrated in the two reducciones of Yavisa and Paya due to the peste of viruelas, which was ravaging the entire province at the time.
In fact the fury of the pestilence led to the recall, in only the second year of their activity, of the two original missionaries who had entered the Darién. The Jesuit missionary endeavor, which had begun so triumphantly a year earlier, now faltered in the face of a devastating outbreak of disease. 80 Fathers Ignacio María Franciscis and Jacobo Walburger replaced Álvarez and Escobar. 81 These two recent arrivals to the New World replaced their brethren in November . Their attempt to effect religious conversions within the new reduced towns would severely test their faith and preconceptions. 82 Their first stop in the Darién was at the lands controlled directly by coronel Juan de Dios and Andrés, the lere and capitán of Moreti. These villages were four days distant from the Spanish town of El Real de Santa María and subsequently almost never visited by Europeans. Juan de Dios and capitán Andrés clearly wanted to keep things that way, and after several minutes of consultation, Walburger decided that far-off Yavisa was the better site for his new reducción. The Jesuits sifted through the Indians of the region and selected those willing to relocate under their tutelage, ultimately gathering a group of indios reducidos numbering  souls. Upon reaching the Tuíra Valley, the two Jesuits split up, with Walburger hoarding the entirety of their human cargo at Yavisa. Franciscis was left to settle at the village of Paya, where the Sicilian Jesuit devoted himself to learning the Tule language and working to produce a vocabulary and grammar of the language. 83 Father Walburger produced a breve noticia that provided the details of his experiences in the Darién and a striking record of the clash of European intellectual expectations with Tule realities. Walburger's breve noticia is notable in many ways, not least for its confrontation with Tule religious beliefs and practices in the eighteenth century. His first paragraph provided an extensive description of the geographical confines and borders of the province of Darién, while the next began by informing the reader that ''the [Indians'] religion is filled with superstitions and blasphemies. '' 84 Walburger went on to report that the Indians described their divinity as residing in the heavens, sitting on a small bench of gold, dressed in silver and gold, his neck, hands, and feet adorned with corals and glass beads.
The divinity resided in a house constructed of silver and gold and adorned with mirrors inside, and even his hammock was of woven gold. The god had in his service Indians of the Darién who provided him, from time to time, food and chicha in gold vessels. The divinity was unaware of what occurred on the earth and learned of terrestrial happenings only after a Tule Indian had died and informed him of recent human events. 85 This account, in spite of a condescending and mocking tone, conforms to the conceptions of the creator deity that have been described by anthropological investigators working among the San Blas Kuna, descendants of the early modern Tule. 86 Modern Kuna believe that divine beings in the spirit realm have entirely different physical and corporeal characteristics to go with their distinct status, and practitioners of the healing tradition are required to learn a different language with which to communicate with these beings. 87 Walburger's assertion that the Indian god needed to be told what had occurred on earth, therefore, appears less ridiculous when interpreted in this light.
Walburger's relation also described an Indian conception of the Spanish god as a separate entity from the Indian god. The Spanish divinity, he had reportedly been told, understandably loved the Spanish more than he did the Indians, and at times in heaven the two deities engaged in battle. The Indians believed that most of the time the Indian god got the better of the Spanish one, but that he retaliated for any celestial defeats by inflicting pestilence upon the lands and animals of the Indians. At the time Walburger was writing his noticia, the Darién's Indians were experiencing waves of disease and increased interaction with the Spanish and other outsiders, thus the story of contesting deities fits the social and political realities that attended the Spanish attempts to subjugate the Indians.
Walburger remarked that the ritual specialists whom the Tule called leres were the big men of the settlement, adding for his most-likely readers that the people ''give these men much respect and credit, as Christians do prelates.'' 88 The Austrian Jesuit recognized that if the Indians believed their creator-god was ignorant of events taking place in the physical world, then the men possessing the ability to communicate with the beings living in the spiritual realm had to be esteemed as very important men: ''If something goes amiss, or someone gets sick, or if something goes awry in the loyalty of the Indians of the band, this requires the consultation of the lere, the principal voice in the town.'' But communication with a spiritual realm brought forth a familiar enemy. Walburger angrily reported that the major function of these pillars of the community was their frequent consultation with the devil, ''whom they conceived to be very practical, and knowledgeable of everything. '' 89 The Jesuit stated that the Indians freely admitted and reveled in their
The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, -  intimate association with the prince of darkness, whom they found to be quite helpful to them. For example, if an Indian lost an animal or a valuable item he said that a nia had taken it, and it was as clear as day to Walburger that the Tule nia was nothing more than the Catholic devil. The present-day San Blas Kuna believe a nia to be a particularly malevolent spirit being who delights in inflicting harm upon a person's purpa, or vital spirit. A nia can only be seen, communicated with, and convinced to depart by an Indian ritual specialist, or lere. 90 English-speaking visitors also made note of unsolicited avowals by Indian ritualists that they conjured the devil in order to heal the sick or to see the future. 91 Rather than linguistic evidence that the Tule had internalized or incorporated crucial elements from the Spanish belief system, as has been argued more appropriately for midcolonial Mexico, 92 I believe that the Indians' use of the Spanish term demonio to stand in for the Tule nia was the result of a simple maneuver of translation. 93 When missionaries began to indoctrinate the Indians in the early seventeenth century, they had obviously substituted the Spanish term demonio for the Tule words nia and purpa, and Tule speakers of Spanish throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries felt free to use the terms interchangeably. The easy substitution of the term demonio for nia and vice versa on the part of bilingual leres was proof that the Catholic priests had not been able to convince the Indians of the malign and base nature of the devil. More sustained religious instruction might have driven out such a free usage of the term nia. Its continued usage, coupled with the very existence of the leres as religious specialists, provided substantial proof, if more was needed, that missionary preaching and indoctrination had not progressed far in the Darién.
Walburger's breve noticia provided ample evidence of the cultural power and influence of the leres in eighteenth-century Tule society. The Jesuit, explaining the strong hold that ''superstition'' had on the Indians, attributed this fact to the ''leres, to whom they give so much respect and credit.'' 94 In local Tule society, the leres were clearly the men who mattered most. The men the Spanish termed capitanes and caciques were important and served the vital function of mediating the villagers' relationships with the rapidly changing outside world, but it was the leres who ensured the community's metaphysical equilibrium and preserved Tule oral traditions. In a clear delineation of the direction in which Tule power flowed, Walburger reported that the leres instructed the chiefs, ''teaching them the things of the times since the Spanish arrived. '' 95 In the colonial world of the Jesuit reducción of Yavisa, where Indians from several disparate villages had been collected, Walburger described his misfortune at having no lewer than four leres in residence in the town. These men, he wrote ruefully, ''incited hatred and abhorrence for the things of the church,'' and, subsequently, ''very few ever came there.'' 96 Although Walburger had begun indoctrinating the Indians by teaching the children of Yavisa how to pray, his ''pleasure was short-lived, for the leres undid all the work I had done.'' 97 According to the Jesuit, the ritualists informed Walburger's charges that hell was not to be feared, for it was a place for the Spaniards, not the Indians; the leres argued that the priest's admonitions were specific to the Jesuit alone and did not apply to his Indian students. 98 Walburger claimed that the four leres concentrated their efforts and conjured for eight days in an attempt to call down a fatal fever upon him, and when this failed, they conspired to lure him away from the town and into the distant mountains where he could easily be killed. The leres planned to inform Walburger that a sick child requiring his attention there could not be moved, but luckily for the priest a sympathetic Tule woman informed him of the plot. 99 From this point forward, Walburger noted, the leres hated him irreconcilably and obstructed all that he attempted to do, going so far as to rebaptize the children to whom the priest had administered that sacrament. The leres, no doubt weary of the Jesuit's incessant talk of demons and Satan, began publicly mocking the Jesuit priest, calling him chui mor chichi, or devil in a black dress.
Walburger failed to combat the power of the leres, or to make inroads into the Tule way of thinking, and he soon came to recognize the truth of the oft-mentioned comment that those Indians who sought baptism in the Darién did so solely to receive Christian names. 100 While some of the Indians who had heard his teachings did call for him moments before their deaths, they did so, he reported, only to be assured that they would see their relatives after they died. Walburger noted despondently that these seekers of the sacrament had no understanding whatever of the doctrine and perceived the rite in purely mechanistic terms. Whatever the reasons, in two years and eight months of religious work, Walburger had performed just sixty-three baptisms. Of these, fifty-two had been performed on children, who were by definition unable to make up their own minds about whether to accept or reject the rite. 101 In the penultimate section of the breve noticia, Walburger's honest description illustrated the utter defeat of his mission. He reported that he was no longer able to convince even those Tule Indians nearest to death to convert, with the dying Indians informing him to his face that they would never believe in the efficacy of the doctrines that he preached to them. The leres had transformed Walburger into so marginal a figure that the townspeople not only made open fun of him, they also held the rites he practiced up to public ridicule. 102
The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, -  The leres deployed popular contempt and mockery as weapons against the priest, entertaining the Indians by acting out pantomimes of the sacraments. On one occasion Walburger discovered the leres performing the mock baptism of a live lizard and several recently killed animals, and he looked on in horror as they intoned the phrases of the Latin rite in colloquial Tule. 103 The priest suffered the ultimate humiliation one afternoon when he returned to the church after having been lured away from the altar in the midst of the mass to find the leres at the altar brazenly carrying out a mockery of the mass, adding ridiculous barbs and jests to the order of the church's most sacred ritual. 104 The Jesuits operating contemporaneously in New France used their knowledge of astronomy and medicine to discredit and ridicule indigenous ritual specialists. 105 By casting into doubt the claims of these men to have direct contact with the sacred, the Jesuits deployed their scientific knowledge in order to strengthen their own claims to divine power. In the North American case, the Jesuits often successfully turned laughter against the North American shaman, whom they believed they had unmasked as nothing more than a rattle-waving charlatan. In the Darién the situation was reversed, and the leres mocked the doctrines of the Catholic faith and used ridicule as a weapon in a wide-ranging, tenacious, and effective program to discredit the Jesuit priest living among them.
Walburger's handling of a lunar eclipse in February , which could have been utilized as proof of the priest's command of sacred knowledge, became mired in the dynamic that had already fixed his status within the village community. The Jesuit reported that he had heard a great uproar the night the moon disappeared. The townspeople, rather than seek his counsel, turned instead to the leres, who retired together and concluded after some consultation that the eclipse was not a message from the Spanish god but was instead a sign that had been sent for them. The leres, not Walburger, provided the villagers with an explanation of the event's meaning, informing them that the Indian god was angry, had displayed his anger by smashing the moon, and would make the Indians pay for their transgressions by taking the life of one of the principal leres. 106 As if on cue, one of the ritual specialists, capitán Andrés, became ill soon thereafter. Several months earlier presidente Alsedo had hoped to transform Andrés from a Tule lere to an indigenous capitán. Andrés's interaction with Walburger proved that the process of hispanicization would require a more concerted effort. Walburger consulted with the stricken man, and the Jesuit claimed that although Andrés had renounced his ritual practices he still would not accept baptism. When asked by Walburger to repudiate his many wives in order to die a member of the church, Andrés responded firmly that he could never renounce the women since he fully expected to enjoy their company in heaven after he died. The capitán-lere abruptly ended their discussion of the Catholic faith by informing Walburger that, no, he did not fear death, since he was assured that ''only the Spanish went to hell, while the Indians went straight to heaven. '' 107 Taking this utterance into account, it is unclear whether Walburger had convinced the capitán-lere to renounce his practices at all, for, as he reported, ''he still consults the other leres, and errors are spread.'' 108 This comment refers to the fact that several of the Christian concepts with which Walburger had been trying to convert Andrés had been passed by Andrés to the other Indians in significantly changed forms. Andrés's case was the closest thing Walburger presented to a conversion narrative in the breve noticia, but the events ran counter to the traditional tropes that his readers would have expected. Andrés, facing death and certain damnation, did not repent and acknowledge the truth of the faith. Quite the opposite had occurred, in fact. Andrés's refusal was a clear signal that Walburger's failure was complete: he could not educate the young, adults were indifferent to his teachings, and the old and the dying ignored him as well.
The Perils of Tribalization
The starkly divergent experiences of Fathers Álvarez and Walburger illustrate the themes of this article. Álvarez aimed primarily to convert and consolidate the indigenous leadership of the Darién; the leaders would then bring to the faith the people over whom they exercised authority. Álvarez was attempting to enact the tribalization of an indigenous people through the baptism and Christianization of the men whom he considered to be their leaders. Although such a strategy was problematic, the pageantry presided over by Alsedo in Panamá City was not just an empty display. By taking part in the ritualized activities, cacique Juan de Dios and capitán-lere Andrés became versed in the ritual, language, and forms required of Spanish indigenous leaders.
Alsedo's assessment of the Spanish strategic situation had forced the issue of Indian religious conversion to fuse with that of the tribal leaders' loyalty to the Crown, and the Tule capitanes, who had been dealing with outsiders for decades, accepted the challenge laid down by the new colonial regime. In accepting the faith, Juan Sanni and Juan de Dios also accepted the benefits and responsibilities attending provincial rulers in the Spanish empire. Presidente Alsedo expected the Indian leaders to lead their pagan subjects to the Catholic faith, never understanding that the caciques had known when they swore fealty to the Crown that their ability to force the Tule villagers to convert was extremely limited.
The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, -  The men and women who actually wielded social power within the isolated Tule communities of the Darién interior had been entirely absent from Alsedo's calculations. While the men Alsedo called caciques had been accruing political power on a colonial and provincial level, the leres, the ritual practitioners who transacted the sacred business of the people, continued to organize and preserve Tule villages at the local level. Hidden from the eyes of the Spanish or other European intruders, the leres wielded power in the communities that comprised the indigenous isthmus, at the same time that tribal leaders such as Juan de Dios forged and managed the community's relationships with outsiders. The dual nature of Tule political power eluded observers such as the presidente, just as it had eluded the other European intruders: the buccaneers and the Scots. Ironically, Father Walburger's bitter firsthand experience made him one of the few European men who got close enough to discern the true nature of local Indian power.
The Tule had made clear to the Austrian Jesuit that none of the answers he provided to the questions confronting the community could supplant those offered by their own system of belief presided over by the leres. Walburger's time among the Tule occurred while the Indians were ravaged by disease, a situation that could have led to a loss of faith in the native healers if they failed to provide relief or protection against illness. Instead the Tule blamed the priest by correlating the missionary's arrival directly with the onset of the sickness. 109 The leres retained their place in the cultural hierarchy, dealt effectively with indigenous concerns regarding illness, and discredited the isolated Jesuit priest living in their midst. They explained that the malevolent Spanish god had caused the catastrophic illness because of his implacable hostility toward the Tule and their god. This theory provided the explanation for the destructive and visible effects of disease on the community and tarred the Jesuit as a pestilential outcast, making the leres even more vital and central to the community. Ironically, Walburger was recognized as a sacred specialist by the leres who learned about him and his creed. But they believed him to wield a malevolent form of power, which he derived from a divinity of minor importance.
Walburger ended his breve noticia with a warning to the Spanish authorities. Greater resources and different tactics would be necessary to defeat the demonic forces that had taken root in the Darién. To make matters worse, the British, who made no attempt to correct the abominable errors of the Tule, sold them guns and other materials and had consequently become highly esteemed by tribal leaders such as Miguel of Calidonia. These dangerous men had gone so far as to send their children to Jamaica to receive their education, and in the Darién, Walburger noted ruefully, it was not allowed ''for a bad word to be spoken against [the British].'' 110 Experience on the ground had forced Walburger to the conclusion that mission-ization needed to be coordinated with a larger imperial project aimed at bringing untamed regions into the core areas of the Spanish empire.
Walburger described the sources of opposition to his mission as comprising more than the tenacious, demonic leres who presided over the Tule rituals. While it was certain, he argued, that the dealings of the leres with the devil had dragged the Indians inexorably toward eternal damnation, the Jesuit concluded that the tribal leadership, rather than Satan, was the core of the problem. The Indian men who had so recently given solemn professions of their faith had, in short order, renounced their oaths. Juan de Dios was a great disappointment. Walburger concluded that he had come to the Spaniards ''only for the silver they offered him.'' 111 Any policy based upon treating the cacique as a representative of Christian authority seemed doomed to fail, especially since the apparently promising Juan de Dios had, Walburger alleged, seen fit to murder Spaniards prior to the signing of the treaties. It would be a very long time, the embittered Jesuit advised his superiors, before the Darién would resemble the other settled provinces of the Spanish empire.
In this assessment, Walburger's thinking fell wide of the mark, as it had in several other respects. For in the end it would not matter whether Juan de Dios, or others like him, had truly accepted the Catholic faith into his heart, since the roots of the failure of Alsedo's policy lay not within the unfathomable soul of a Juan de Dios, but rather deeper within the complicated indigenous polity. The presidente had in fact succeeded in establishing a nominally Christian provincial ruling structure for the Darién, an achievement that was no small feat. But Alsedo was unaware that the ruling structure upon which he had placed his imprimatur lacked the coercive capacity, and perhaps the inclination, to challenge or transform the power that the leres wielded in the village communities. The Tule caciques and capitanes, even if they had desired to do so, lacked the ideological and physical resources that they needed to transform the religious life of the Tule people.
Padre Jacobo Walburger died among the Tule in , no doubt contemplating until the end of his days the profound failure of his ministry. 112 By the mid-s Juan de Dios, who had so recently raised himself from a local village leader to the office of the Darién's cacique, would also become a casualty of the Spanish failure in the Darién. Having used his cunning and ambition to climb to the apex of the nascent system of Spanish regional rule, he had left himself nothing to hold onto when that system crumbled beneath him. As late as  Juan de Dios plaintively addressed a memorial to the presidente and the bishop of Panamá City, writing that the absence of missionary activity among his people was a matter of grief and concern
The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, -  to him. He did ''consider [it to be a] great lack . . . to have a town without a doctrinero,'' or missionary priest. Even after he had lost the confidence of the administrators, Juan de Dios still thought it worth his while to petition the presidente on these matters. 113 In a sign of their inability to grasp the workings of indigenous power, Spanish officials in Panamá City held Juan de Dios responsible for the system's collapse, rather than listing him, with Walburger and the Jesuits, as one of its victims.
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The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, -   The town had but a small garrison of Spanish soldiers who were headquartered at a modest wooden fort with a thatched roof. The fort is described by Joaquín Balcárcel de Miranda in his letter of  Feb.  to Dionisio Alsedo y Herrera,  Panamá .  Alsedo provides information on the priest Pomar and the problems he caused in his letter to the king of  Mar. ,  Panamá . The activities of Father Pomar are described in folio pp. -. Juan Pomar was the brother of the teniente of the town of Penonomé, a man named Idelfonso de Pomar y Burgos. The brothers had both been found culpable in the proceedings of a high-level investigation, or pesquisa, and a command had been dispatched from Madrid ordering the viceroy to suspend Idelfonso Pomar from his offices. A pesquisa investigation was a serious matter, and the investigator, armed with broad powers, was dispatched by royal order to make an on-site examination pertaining to a list of specific charges. This particular investigation was instigated by a list of charges brought to the attention of the Crown by the oidor who was acting as the fiscal agent of the audiencia, Licenciado Juan Pérez García. Pérez was no stranger to controversy and had been the primary target of Alsedo's campaign to rid central Panamá of contraband traders and their allies. When he learned of this situation, Juan Pomar decided it was in his family's interest for him to leave his parish in Panamá City and rush to Cartagena to present a petition before the viceroy. The vicar general was not pleased when he learned of the priest's trip, and he promptly dispatched a comisionario with orders to track down the priest and bring him back to the city. This vicarial official had orders to seize the man's goods, read the general censures against the wayward priest (including the anathema), and use whatever force was required to ensure his return. When Presidente Alsedo learned of the broad authority that the vicar general had granted the comisionario, he angrily ordered him deposed, jailed, and brought back to Panamá City as soon as possible. By the time the two Jesuits arrived at El Real, therefore, both Padre Juan de Pomar y Burgos and the vicarial comisionario were in custody in the small fort. The Spanish militiamen and soldiers serving there had been disquieted by the grave censures that the comisionario had read. Most important, the Indians were in an even greater turmoil due to the harsh injunctions that they had heard the vicarial comisionario utter.  Letter of Alsedo,  Panamá . Alsedo noted that Álvarez, Pomar, and the comisionario arrived in the city on  Oct.  and that it was ''one of the most disorderly days the city had ever seen.'' The Pomar brothers had considerable support in the town, and, when placed on trial for leaving his parish without secular or ecclesiastical permission, Juan Pomar was absolved after a process that took two months, an outcome that Alsedo stated, ''amazed those who had observed or considered the case.'' After being absolved he obtained the proper permission, passed overland to Cartagena, and presented his family's case before the viceroy. Joaquín Balcárcel de Miranda, interim governor of the Darién, wrote in a letter of  Feb.  to Alsedo that Pomar had passed through El Real on  Jan. on his way to Cartagena and was allowed to continue his journey, ''having shown to me his license to travel, which was issued by yourself.'' Letter of Balcárcel de Miranda,  Feb. ,  Panamá , r.  Letter of Álvarez,  Jan. ,  Panamá .
